SORBONNE NOUVELLE
(UNIVERSITÉ PARIS III)
SYMPOSIUM
17 ET 18 JUIN 2011
« L’HÉRITAGE DE THÉODORE ROOSEVELT :
IMPÉRIALISME ET PROGRESSISME (1912-2012) »
CONTRIBUTORS
André Béziat est Professeur Agrégé et Maître de Conférences honoraireà l’Université de Perpignan via domitia.. Il est docteur en Études nord-américaines avec une thèse publiée sous le titre : Franklin Roosevelt et la France (1939-1945) : la diplomatie de l’entêtement (Paris : L’Harmattan, 1997). Il compte parmi ses articles: “Le général de Gaulle était-il antiaméricain pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale ?”; “La diplomatie du président Roosevelt pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale : unilatéralisme à l’Ouest, multilatéralisme à l’Est”; “Le réalisme diplomatique à rude épreuve : Washington et Vichy (juillet 1940-novembre 1942)”; “Franklin D. Roosevelt et Charles de Gaulle : les limites culturelles d’une approche”; “Roosevelt à Yalta : des accords à tout prix ?”
“Le président Franklin Roosevelt et les impérialismes pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale :
un anticolonialisme désintéressé ?”
Abstract: After the conquest of the West was formally ended in 1890, the United States turned to outward expansion to find new markets for its products and to allegedly improve the lot of subjugated nations. Commerce and messianic purposes were the hallmarks of Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy, which was implemented, when necessary, through his so called “big stick” policy. In turn, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s diplomacy was epitomized by the messianic idea of improving people’s fate and promoted militant anti-colonialism while taking into account the United States’ economic and geopolitical interests as was the case, respectively, with Morocco and Indochina. As the Second World War went on, Roosevelt became the most powerful leader in the world, heading the number one industrial nation that had become “the arsenal of democracy”. This gave him the power to impose his views as early as August 1941 when he officially endorsed the end of colonialism through the Atlantic Charter, which was also signed –though reluctantly– by Winston Churchill. The French and British empires were particularly targeted as Roosevelt considered turning their colonies into trusteeships until they were qualified for self-government. On the other hand, there was not much he could do to restrain the new Soviet Union’s zone of influence in the making or to prevent its annexations. In the short term, the plan designed for Britain and France did not work as expected as, at the end of the war, both countries had recovered their empires. However, in the long term, their colonies won their independence as President Roosevelt had wished they would and, by the end of the century, East European nations had finally turned to free elections as stipulated by the Yalta agreements for which Roosevelt had long been accused of short-sightedness.
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Michael Patrick Cullinane is a Lecturer in US History at Northumbria University at Newcastle. He is the author of several articles and chapters on Theodore Roosevelt’s legacy and has just completed a book about US anti-imperialism (“Liberty” and Empire: The Opposition to US Foreign Policy, 1898-1908) which is currently under review. He is also working on a long-term project that will evaluate the memory of Theodore Roosevelt.
“The 1920 Election and the Harding Compromise :
Forgetting Progressivism and Internationalism while Remembering TR”
Abstract: It’s not clear if Theodore Roosevelt would have run for President in 1920, but if he lived it is entirely likely that he would have been instrumental in deciding the nominee. After winning two national elections, hand-picking a successor, staging the most successful third-party campaign, and reuniting the Republican Party in 1916, no figure in Republican politics was more influential. However, with Roosevelt’s voice noticeably absent at the national convention, the Party was left to choose a candidate without his opinion. All of the nominees claimed to best represent his legacy, but only two were actual protégés: Hiram Johnson of California and General Leonard Wood of New Hampshire. Johnson was TR’s running-mate on the Progressive ticket in 1912 and symbolized his progressive legacy. Wood served with Roosevelt in Cuba and as Governor of Cuba and the Philippines and symbolized TR’s legacy as an internationalist. This paper argues that the 1920 Republican convention was a showdown between progressive and internationalist forces represented by these nominees and the “Old Guard” of conservative Republicans. What this paper seeks to explain is how the eventual nominee – Warren G. Harding, who was perhaps the most unlike Roosevelt – was a repudiation of Rooseveltian policies while concurrently a celebration of Roosevelt, the man. Since 1919, Harding had begun to fashion himself as a Roosevelt acolyte, while promoting policies that were considered antithetical to Roosevelt’s. This paper argues that Harding’s election was a transformational event in the construction of the Roosevelt legacy that allowed his image to be co-opted arbitrarily. Since 1920, political contestants have been able to use TR’s image as a nostalgic reference without addressing potential conflicts with TR’s vision at home and abroad.
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Douglas Eden is an Associate Fellow of the Institute for the Study of the Americas (ISA), School of Advanced Study, University of London (associated with predecessor Institute for United States Studies since 1980), and Senior Atlantic Fellow of the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom. He was formerly Head of The Centre for Study of International Affairs (Europe and America) and director of the Trent Park International Conferences on the Future of the Atlantic Community at Middlesex University, London (retired 2001). He is a member of the editorial board of the Transatlantic Studies Journal and the advisory board of the Theodore Roosevelt Association. His publications include Europe and the Atlantic Relationship: Issues of Identity, Security and Power (2000); The Future of the Atlantic Community (1997); Political Change in Europe: the Left and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance (1980-81); “Theodore Roosevelt” in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of War, ed. Gordon Martel (November 2011); “Theodore Roosevelt and the European Crisis of 1905-1906” in A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Serge Ricard (Wiley-Blackwell, London and New York, September 2011); “Democracy” and “Reform, Liberalism and Populism” in Britain and the Americas: Culture, Politics and History, 3 vols., ed. Will Kaufman and Heidi Macpherson (2005); “Democracy” in Reader’s Guide to American History, ed. Peter J Parish (1997).
“Could Rooseveltian Diplomacy Have Prevented the Great War ?”
Abstract: This paper first attempts to define “Rooseveltian Diplomacy,” using President Theodore Roosevelt’s successful intervention in the European Crisis of 1905-06 to prevent a world conflagration as its prime example. The paper then considers the position of the United States in world affairs in 1912 and the effect Roosevelt’s re-election that year might have had on US foreign policy and America’s great power status. Finally, the paper discusses whether the same style of diplomacy practiced by TR in 1905-06 could have been deployed successfully in 1914 by him or any other American president.
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Marie Gayte est ATER à l’université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis et membre de l’Observatoire de la politique américaine (CREW-EA 4399) à l’Université Paris III-Sorbonne nouvelle. Elle a récemment été élue Maître de Conférences à l’Université de Toulon (à compter de la rentrée 2011).
Marie Gayte is a Junior Lecturer at Paris 8-Vincennes-Saint-Denis University and a member of the Observatoire de la politique américaine (CREW-EA 4399) at Paris III-Sorbonne nouvelle University. She has recently been hired by the University of Toulon as Associate Professor, as of September 2011.
“L’indifférence face au Vatican à l’épreuve de l’impérialisme américain ”
Abstract: Depuis les origines, les Etats-Unis entretiennent des relations complexes avec le Vatican. Sous la pression d’une opinion hostile envers l’Eglise catholique, Washington renonce en 1867 à entretenir toute relation continue avec le Saint-Siège alors que ce dernier est sur le point de perdre ses derniers territoires. Par la suite, il semble ne plus y avoir aucun intérêt à entretenir des rapports avec une entité réduite à son seul rôle spirituel. Cependant, la fin du 19e et le début du 20e siècle voient les Etats-Unis devenir une puissance mondiale à la tête d’un empire naissant. Dans le même temps, le Saint-Siège, parce qu’il n’a plus d’intérêt temporel à défendre, acquiert le rôle d’autorité morale, de plus en plus sollicitée par les Etats pour sa position impartiale sur la scène internationale.
Theodore Roosevelt va être le premier président, contraint par les circonstances internationales, à prendre conscience qu’une puissance mondiale comme les Etats-Unis ne peut éviter tout contact avec le Saint-Siège. Se retrouvant à la tête d’un « empire », il doit composer avec une Eglise à vocation universelle et qui joue un rôle important dans certains territoires récemment acquis, comme les Philippines. Cette fois-ci, ce n’est plus en tant qu’autorité temporelle, mais du fait du magistère spirituel du pape ou de sa fonction de chef de l’Eglise, que Washington est amené à traiter avec Rome. Pour autant, les Etats-Unis refusent de reconnaître ces contacts comme officiels, inaugurant presqu’un siècle de relations intermittentes, officieuses et asymétriques ; alors que les événements internationaux (deux conflits mondiaux, la guerre du Vietnam…) le pousse toujours plus sur le devant de la scène nationale, rendant indispensable des contacts avec le Vatican, Washington renâcle à s’engager sur la voie des relations officielle près le Saint-Siège.
Les détracteurs de relations diplomatiques avec le siège du catholicisme romain font valoir qu’une telle mesure constituerait une violation sinon de la lettre, sinon de l’esprit, de la Constitution, et que tout gouvernement qui s’aventurerait dans cette direction le paierait dans les urnes. Cette longue période de valse-hésitation, où les considérations de politique intérieure et électorale l’emportent sur les considérations de politique étrangère, s’achèvera avec la nomination par Ronald Reagan du premier ambassadeur américain près le Saint-Siège en 1984, décision qui intervient dans des circonstances radicalement différentes de celles qui prévalaient jusqu’alors, et dont les considérations nationales et électorales, qui militaient jadis contre l’établissement de telles relations, ne sont pas absentes.
“Imperialism vs. Indifference: The Heritage of Theodore Roosevelt’s Attitude toward the Vatican”
Abstract: Since its inception, the United States has had complex relations with the Vatican. In 1867, with public opinion largely hostile toward the Catholic Church, Washington brought sustained contacts with the Holy See to a halt as the head of the Roman church was on the verge of losing its last remaining territories. In following years, there seemed to be no interest in pursuing relationships with an entity whose power was now limited solely to the spiritual sphere. Yet, at the turn of the 20th century, the United States was on its way to becoming a world power, at the head of a small empire. Meanwhile, no longer having to fight on behalf of earthly possessions, the Holy See was enjoying the status of world moral authority, to which many states turned for impartial rulings.
Theodore Roosevelt was the first American president who, under the pressure of international circumstances, had to acknowledge that a world power like the United States could not avoid all contacts with the Holy See. He had to deal with a church that not only had a universal mandate, but which also played an important role in some newly acquired U.S. territories, such as the Philippines. Yet, the United States would not accept official contacts, thus inaugurating nearly a century of intermittent, unofficial, and asymmetrical relations. As international events pushed the United States ever more to the fore of the international stage throughout the 20th century, Washington still shied away from official relations with the Holy See.
Opponents to diplomatic ties argued that such a step would constitute a breach of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the Constitution. Any government bold enough to take this step would pay a heavy price in the ballot box, they threatened. This long period of ambiguity, where domestic policy concerns prevailed over foreign ones, ended in 1984 with the appointment by Ronald Reagan of the first U.S. ambassador to the Holy See. This decision was made within radically different circumstances from those prevailing until then and in a context where domestic considerations, which once made the idea of diplomatic relations anathema, were now central.
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Andrew M. Johnston is an Associate Professor of history at Carleton University in Ottawa. He is also an Associate Director of Carleton’s Centre of American Studies, and a former director of the Centre for American Studies at the University of Western Ontario. He is the author of Hegemony and culture in the origins of NATO nuclear first-use (2005) as well as other articles on American nuclear strategy and liberal internationalism. His current research looks at the social and cultural forces at play in the origins of American internationalism between 1880 and 1920.
“Theodore Roosevelt and The Neoconservatives”
Abstract: The question of where American neoconservatism fits into its political traditions has been a subject of considerable debate. Robert Kagan has recently asserted that the best tendencies of American internationalism from the outset were essentially neoconservative. The need for ideologies to situate themselves in the particular historical development of its national culture is not surprising, and of course it demands a certain simplification of the past in order that discontinuities can be eased into a kind of teleological path that leads inevitably to the present. The case of the neoconservatives and legacy of Theodore Roosevelt is complicated by the diversity of forms neoconservatism has taken since the 1960s but also by the ebb and flow of Roosevelt's reputation. The Republican Progressive was not initially an important part of the repertoire of the neoconservatives, but in the third generation—those after 1995—he has been increasingly held up as an exemplar of robust internationalism. This paper examines the way neoconservative intellectuals have used Roosevelt to locate their foreign policy prescriptions in an American genealogy. All historical analogies are fallible but they are also indispensable tools for argumentation. And they tell us something critical about the ideological and psychological associations of the user. Why reach to Theodore Roosevelt when the memory of the 1930s offered more prescient and affective for earlier generations of neoconservatives?
The question of where American neoconservatism fits into its political traditions has been a subject of considerable debate. Robert Kagan has recently asserted that the best tendencies of American internationalism from the outset were essentially neoconservative. The need for ideologies to situate themselves in the particular historical development of its national culture is not surprising, and of course it demands a certain simplification of the past in order that discontinuities can be eased into a kind of teleological path that leads inevitably to the present. The case of the neoconservatives and legacy of Theodore Roosevelt is complicated by the diversity of forms neoconservatism has taken since the 1960s but also by the ebb and flow of Roosevelt's reputation. The Republican Progressive was not initially an important part of the repertoire of the neoconservatives, but in the third generation—those after 1995—he has been increasingly held up as an examplar of robust internationalism. This paper examines the way neoconservative intellectuals have used Roosevelt to locate their foreign policy prescriptions in an American genealogy. All historical analogies are fallible but they are also indispensable tools for argumentation. And they tell us something critical about the ideological and psychological associations of the user. Why reach to Theodore Roosevelt when the memory of the 1930s offered more prescient and affective for earlier generations of neoconservatives?
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Maya Kandel est chercheur associée à l'Observatoire de la Politique Américaine (EA CREW / OPA) de l'Université Sorbonne Nouvelle (Paris 3). Historienne, docteur de l'IEP de Paris, elle est spécialiste de la politique étrangère américaine depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Son dernier article, « Obama et la politique étrangère américaine », a été publié dans la revue Esprit (mars-avril 2011).
Clinton en Bosnie : l’interventionnisme libéral des années 1990, impérialisme ou progressisme ?
Abstract: Les interventions américaines dans les Balkans (Bosnie puis Kosovo), sous le mandat du président Bill Clinton, sont non seulement emblématiques de la décennie 1990, mais elles signalent également la renaissance d'une politique étrangère proprement démocrate : la Bosnie reste comme le symbole de la politique étrangère progressiste d'un parti démocrate enfin débarrassé de son complexe vietnamien et de sa réticence quant à l'utilisation de la force militaire.
Or ces mêmes interventions balkaniques ont également été soutenues par certains néoconservateurs américains, les mêmes qui ont ensuite promu l’intervention en Irak - et qu’on a accusés d’impérialisme.
Ces deux courants, faucons libéraux et néoconservateurs, se placent dans la tradition de Theodore Roosevelt d'une politique étrangère interventionniste et d'une Amérique comme « world policeman » - une notion qu'on a retrouvée aussi bien dans l'interventionnisme balkanique que dans le Grand Moyen-Orient de la décennie suivante, justifiés à chaque fois par une conception élargie des intérêts américains dans le monde post-guerre froide.
Ces deux courants du débat de politique étrangère - qu'on avait peut-être enterrés un peu vite - se retrouvent à nouveau au premier plan depuis deux mois, dans un même soutien à l'opération libyenne engagée par l'OTAN contre le Colonel Kadhafi. Ce qui repose la question de la proximité idéologique entre ces deux familles de pensée.
L’interventionnisme libéral est-il une doctrine progressiste, voire la doctrine démocrate en politique étrangère – donc celle, aussi, de Barack Obama ? Mais que signifie alors le soutien des néoconservateurs et d’une partie des républicains ? Est-ce le signe que ce type d’intervention, fondé sur la morale et un militarisme « pour la bonne cause », serait tout de même impérialiste ? Ou bien serait-ce le signe qu’un consensus bipartisan demeure possible sur la politique étrangère américaine ? A moins que ce ne soit qu'un rappel que ces deux « camps » sont issus du même courant idéologique ? Ou encore un simple hasard, chacun soutenant ces interventions pour des raisons différentes ?
La communication tentera de proposer des pistes d'analyses et de réponses, en revenant sur la politique de Clinton en Bosnie.
Clinton, Bosnia and the Liberal Hawks of the 1990s :
A Progressive Foreign Policy or Another Imperialism ?
Abstract: American interventions in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo) during President Clinton’s presidency are not only emblematic of the 1990s, they also signal the revival of a truly democratic foreign policy. As such, Bosnia seems to represent the successful efforts of a democratic party that would finally have overcome its Vietnam divisions and its reluctance to use military force.
But the Balkan interventions were also supported by a number of American neoconservatives – who later on promoted the Iraq war and were accused of being imperialists.
Both schools of thought belong to an interventionist tradition in U.S. foreign policy thinking and echo Theodore Roosevelt’s notion of « America as world policeman » - a notion that was found in Balkan interventionism as well as in the Greater Middle East project of the following decade, each time justified by a larger definition of U.S. interests in a post-Cold War world.
Liberal hawks and neocons are once again more or less united in supporting U.S. intervention in Libya through NATO’s operations to remove Kadhafi, raising new questions about the similarities between liberal interventionism and neoconservatism.
Therefore one might ask: is liberal interventionism a progressive doctrine ? Is it the foreign policy doctrine of the democrats – is it the Obama doctrine ? But then, what does neocon support mean ? Would it be that any intervention based on values and the use of military might for a « good cause » is still imperialist ? Or is it just a reminder that both liberal hawks and neocons are originally from the same family ? Or does it signal that a bipartisan foreign policy is possible today?
The communication will try to offer some insights starting with an analysis of Clinton’s policy in Bosnia
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William R. Keylor a obtenu son BA à Stanford University et son MA et Ph.D. à Columbia University. Il est professeur d’histoire et de relations internationales à Boston University, où il fut chef de son département d’histoire de 1988 à 2000, et où il dirige l’Institut d’Histoire Internationale (International History Institute). Il a publié plusieurs ouvrages sur l’histoire moderne, dont Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession (Harvard University Press, 1975); Jacques Bainville and the Renaissance of Royalist History in Twentieth-Century France (Louisiana State University Press, 1979); The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: An International History since 1900 (6e édition, Oxford University Press, 2011); The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919 (Houghton Mifflin Publishers, 1997) et A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945 (2e édition, Oxford University Press, 2008). Il a été nommé Fulbright Advanced Teaching Fellow, Fubright Research Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Fellow, Guggenheim Fellow, et Chevalier de l'Ordre National du Mérite. Il est ancient président de la Société d’Études Historiques Françaises.
William R. Keylor received his BA from Stanford University and his MA and Ph.D. from Columbia University. He is Professor of history and international relations at Boston University, where he was Chair of its department of history from 1988 to 2000 at where he currently serves as director of the International History Institute. He has published several works on modern history, including Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession (Harvard University Press, 1975); Jacques Bainville and the Renaissance of Royalist History in Twentieth-Century France (Louisiana State University Press, 1979); The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond: An International History since 1900 (6th edition, Oxford University Press, 2005); The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919 (Houghton Mifflin Publishers, 1997); and A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945 (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2008). He has been named an Advanced Fulbright Teaching Fellow, a Fulbright Research Fellow, a Guggenheim Fellow, and Chevalier de l’Ordre National du Mérite by the French government. He is a former president of the Society for French Historical Studies.
“American Exceptionalism from T.R. to the New Left
Abstract: There is widespread disagreement about the origins of the term “American Exceptionalism.” But no one disagrees about its essential meaning. The phrase posits that the United States of America is utterly unique among the nations of the world. The history of that particular country somehow sets it apart from the history of all others. Before the turn of the twentieth-century, this term was usually employed to describe the internal, domestic institutions of the American Republic and how they shaped the uniqueness of the American character. But with the advent of the new century as the United States began its ascent toward world power, American exceptionalism assumed a new, broader denotation. With Theodore Roosevelt in the lead, the modern proponents of American exceptionalism advocated the projection of American power beyond its shores in order to promote American interests and values across the globe.
Woodrow Wilson, usually regarded as the polar opposite as his long-time nemesis T.R., adopted and expanded this concept to propose a new global world order based on American power and principles before it was repudiated by the U.S. Senate. Franklin Roosevelt, a junior member of Wilson’s administration during World War I, revived that mission during the Second World War. The concept of America as a unique, exceptional nation with a global mission reached its height during the Cold War, when the United States extended its military protection, provided economic assistance, and promoted its cultural values to non-Communist countries across the world with their full acquiescence. But that projection of American “hard” and “soft” power throughout the world generated a powerful counter-reaction both at home and abroad beginning in the 1960s. The New Left seized the concept of American exceptionalism from its ardent proponents and turned it on its head: America became an exceptional source of evil in the world. Most of the suffering and oppression across the globe could be traced to the American quest for military, economic, and cultural hegemony. The image of a “city on a hill” was coined by the Puritan leader John Winthrop and frequently employed by Ronald Reagan to celebrate his country’s uniqueness and greatness. From the perspective of the New Left at home and abroad, the new metaphor of American exceptionalism was an armed fortress on a hill, hurling death, destruction, and suffering on the unfortunate people below.
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Michael Kort holds a Ph.D. in Russian history and is professor of social science at Boston University. He is the author of The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (1985; 7th ed. 2010), The Columbia Guide to the Cold War (1998), The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb (2007), and A Brief History of Russia (2008), and co-author of Modernization and Revolution in China (1991; 4th ed. 2009). He is a member of the Advisory Board of the Theodore Roosevelt Association.
“An Odd Couple: Truman and Nixon as TR Foreign Policy Heirs”
Abstract: Notwithstanding the significant differences between them, both Harry Truman and Richard Nixon may be considered foreign policy heirs of Theodore Roosevelt. Like TR, Truman and Nixon understood the need to back diplomacy with military power, had to deal with significant changes in the relative strengths of the great powers of their eras, and successfully crafted policies to meet those new conditions. Truman successfully responded to the post-World War II challenges faced by United States and the European democracies with the policy of containment, specifically with the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and NATO. His handling of the Korean War reinforced containment and did not shift its focus from Europe. Nixon, working closely with Henry Kissinger, during the late 1960s and early 1970s responded creatively and effectively to the relative decline of American power and the evolving Soviet challenge with the policy of detent, which was complemented and reinforced by the opening to China. Nixon’s handling of the Vietnam War reflected the narrow range of options he had and arguably achieved considerable success by 1972. It seems reasonable to assume that TR would have accepted the respective work of Truman and Nixon as consistent with his presidential legacy.
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Élise Marienstras est professeur émérite à l'Université Paris-Diderot. Spécialiste de l'histoire des Etats-Unis à la période coloniale et révolutionnaire, elle est aussi l'auteur de Wounded Knee. L'Amérique au tournant du siècle (Editions Complexe, Bruxelles 1996).
Élise Marienstras is Professor Emeritus at Paris Diderot University. A specialist of colonial and revolutionary US history, she is the author of Wounded Knee. L’Amérique au tournant du siècle [Wounded Knee. America at the Turn of the Century] (Editions Complexe, Brussels 1996).
“De Theodore Roosevelt à Franklin Delano Roosevelt :
les Amérindiens, objets des politiques progressistes et impérialistes”
Abstract: Le thème du colloque, « impérialisme et progressisme » sera abordé par le prisme de la politique indienne menée tant par les autorités fédérales que par les mouvements religieux et civils des « Amis des Indiens » , par l'armée et les éducateurs, par le Bureau des Affaires indiennes et le Congrès des États-Unis.
Une évolution se dessine nettement dans cette politique, qui voit son aboutissement avec la loi du « New Deal Indien » mise en place par John Collier. De quel progressisme fait-elle foi? L'impérialisme a-t-il disparu?
“From Theodore Roosevelt to Franklin Roosevelt:
Amerindians as Subjects for Progressive and Imperialist Policies”
Abstract: The theme of the symposium will be tackled through the prism of Indian policy as carried out both by the federal authorities and the “Friends of the Indians”’ religious and civil movements, by the Army and the educators, by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and by the US Congress. An evolution was perceptible in policies that culminated with the Indian New Deal instituted by John Collier. What kind of progressivism did the Wheeler-Howard Act bear witness to? Had imperialism disappeared
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Vincent Michelot is a Professor at the Institut d'études politiques in Lyon where he teaches American politics. A specialist of US institutions, he is the author of a doctoral dissertation on Supreme Court appointments and two essays on the US presidency, L'empereur de la Maison Blanche (2004) and Le président des États-Unis : un pouvoir impérial ? (2008), together with numerous articles on presidential and congressional elections, federalism and judicial issues. He is presently working on two projects: a constitutional history of the right to vote since the 1960s and a political biography of John F. Kennedy.
“Théodore Roosevelt ou les paradoxes de l’invention d’une présidence progressiste”
Abstract: Dans la communauté des spécialistes de l'exécutif américain, nul ne s'aventurerait à contester l'idée presque mythologique d'un Théodore Roosevelt inventeur de la présidence moderne. Or les deux mandats de TR sont aussi marqués au sceau paradoxal du progressisme à l'intérieur et de l'empire à l'extérieur. Faut-il en déduire que ce sont là des attributs intrinsèques à la modernité de l'exécutif américain ou le résultat d'un simple concours de circonstances peu susceptible de se reproduire ? En replaçant les années 1901-1909 dans la perspective historique d'autres présidences dites comme progressistes, ce texte se propose d'identifier les structures rémanentes de la présidence moderne telle que TR la façonne pour ouvrir le débat sur la nature de l'Administration Obama et les mutations institutionnelles du progressisme américain.
“Theodore Roosevelt or the Paradoxical Invention of the Progressive Presidency”
Abstract: In the community of presidential scholars, rare are those who would dispute the quasi-mythological idea that Theodore Roosevelt invented the modern presidency. TR's two terms in office are often characterized in the seemingly oxymoronic affirmation and development of progressive ideas at home and empire abroad. Does that mean that the apparent paradox is intrinsic to the modern US executive or simply the byproduct of a special set of circumstances which is unlikely to ever present itself again? By placing the years 1901-1909 in the historical perspective of other presidencies described as progressive, this paper proposes to identify the superstructures of the modern presidency as TR built it in order to open the debate on the nature of the Obama Administration and the institutional mutations of the Progressive movement in the United States.
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Sidney Milkis is the White Burkett Miller Professor in the Department of Politics and Associate Director for Democracy and Governance Studies at the Miller Center of Public Affairs. He has a B.A. from Muhlenberg College and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania. His books include The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal (1993); Political Parties and Constitutional Government: Remaking American Democracy (1999); Presidential Greatness (2000), coauthored with Marc Landy; The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-2011 (2011), 6th edition, coauthored with Michael Nelson; and Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party, and the Transformation of American Democracy. He is the coeditor, with Jerome Mileur, of thee volumes on twentieth century political reform: Progressivism and the New Democracy (1999); The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism (2002); and The Great Society and the Rights Revolution (forthcoming). His articles on American government and political history have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, Studies in American Political Development, the Journal of Policy History, Perspectives on American Politics and several edited volumes. In addition to teaching graduate and undergraduate students, he regularly gives public lectures on American politics and participates in programs that teach political history to public school teachers and international scholars.
“Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party, and the Ascendance of the Living Constitution”
Abstract: Led by Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party made the 1912 campaign a passionate contest for the constitutional soul of the American people. Promoting an ambitious program of economic, social, and political reform - "New Nationalism" - that posed profound challenges to constitutional government, TR and his Progressive supporters provoked an extraordinary debate about the future of the country. Beyond the 1912 election, the Progressive Party's program of social reform and "direct democracy" has reverberated through American politics -- bequeathing a "living" Constitution that subordinates natural rights to mass public opinion and limited constitutional government to national administration. Presently at the center of Americans' hopes and discontents, the Progressive idea of politics and government is a critical starting point for still another searching look at the meaning and responsibilities of American democracy.
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Maud Quessard-Salvaing, ancienne élève de Sciences Po Bordeaux, est docteur en civilisation nord-américaine de la Sorbonne Nouvelle; elle est l’auteur d’une thèse intitulée : « Information, propagande et diplomatie publique : les stratégies de l’USIA d’Eisenhower à Reagan ». Ses recherches en cours portent sur les stratégies du soft et du smart power américain, les programmes d’échanges gouvernementaux, et la corporate diplomacy. Elle a récemment été élue Maître de Conférences à l’Université de Poitiers (à compter de la rentrée 2011).
“La diplomatie publique reaganienne manifestation progressiste de l’impérialisme américain
de Nouvelle Guerre froide ?”
Abstract: Le contexte de Nouvelle Guerre froide qui marque le début des années 1980, se caractérise par un regain de tensions impérialistes entre l’URSS et les Etats-Unis pour maintenir leurs zones d’influences idéologiques et géostratégiques, en particulier sur le territoire européen. A l’heure de l’exaltation des valeurs nationales et du rassemblement du Grand Old Party autour d’un conservatisme réaffirmé du leadership présidentiel sur le plan intérieur, le retour en force de l’hégémonie américaine, à l’échelle internationale, s’accompagne du développement d’un nouvel arsenal de persuasion en direction des démocraties alliées et de libéralisation de la sphère publique en direction des « nations captives ». La diplomatie publique reaganienne s’affirme alors comme l’expression d’une Nouvelle Destinée Manifeste, dont la mission principale conduite par l’USIA est d’exporter le modèle de démocratie américain de l’ère Reagan comme un progrès (politique, économique ou social) auprès des populations ouest européennes comme est européennes. Paradoxe ou exception au service de l’exceptionnalisme, la diplomatie publique reaganienne, illustration visionnaire des stratégies contemporaines du smart power, se serait imposée comme une arme redoutable de promotion du libéralisme démocratique au service des intérêts de l’impérialisme américain de guerre froide.
“The Reagan Administration’s Public Diplomacy as the Progressive Manifestation
of American Imperialism in the New Cold War?
Abstract: The climactic battles of the second Cold War, which took place at the onset of the Reagan years, were enhanced by the revival of imperialistic tensions between the USSR and the US. The intention of the two superpowers was to maintain their ideological and geostrategic spheres of influence, namely on European territories. While the Republican President, Ronald Reagan, catalyzed conservative predominance in the GOP and promoted national values on the home front, the reassertion of the myth of American hegemony overseas was strengthened by the launching of new weapons of political warfare. US public diplomacy soon took center stage in the struggle to win over the hearts and minds of the European populations by disseminating Ronald Reagan’s Manifest Destiny. In the European battle for freedom, the White House laid out a specific mission for the United States Information Agency (USIA). Indeed the Reagan Administration used public diplomacy as a central component of its national strategy to fight back in the cold war propaganda war, to rally allied support for anti-Soviet policies, to inspire political dissidents in “the captive nations” – behind the iron curtain, and to provide a positive, persuasive alternative to communism through the example of liberal democracy. The goal was to challenge and subvert the Soviet system by selling the American model of democracy to the European people as a progressive one – politically, economically and socially. Paradoxically enough, the Reagan Administration’s instrumental use of public diplomacy to promote American exceptionalism for the sake of cold war imperialistic interests, has laid the foundations for today’s strategies of smart power.
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William N. Tilchin earned a Ph.D. in History at Brown University in 1992. Currently he is an Associate Professor of social sciences and history at Boston University, where he teaches the history of U.S. foreign relations and various other subjects. He is the author of Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft (1997) and many essays on Roosevelt’s presidency and foreign policy. He is the co-editor (with Charles E. Neu) of Artists of Power: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Their Enduring Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy (2006). He also is the editor of the quarterly Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal.
“Anticipating and Forging the Future: Theodore Roosevelt's Foreign Policy Legacy”
Abstract: Commonly focusing on World War I as the actual beginning of the twentieth century and therefore on Woodrow Wilson's presidency as the natural starting point in a search for the roots of U.S. diplomacy from World War II to the present, historians have tended to overlook the true origins of modern American statecraft. For, in reality, no president or other foreign policy decision-maker in the history of the United States has matched Theodore Roosevelt with regard to an innovative framework and a long-range vision and blueprint for U.S. foreign relations. It was Theodore Roosevelt, not Woodrow Wilson, who set the course for a powerful U.S. military featuring a permanently large, up-to-date, well-equipped, well-prepared U.S. Navy, who first developed and implemented a concept of broadly defined U.S. interests, and who grasped the imperative of a special relationship between the British Empire and the United States. With the important exception of a strong navy, these ideas were not embraced by TR's successors until the disastrous folly of isolationism and appeasement became apparent in 1939. Since that time TR's fundamental precepts have usually guided U.S. foreign policy -- most effectively when Rooseveltian statesmen such as Harry Truman, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz have been at the helm. U.S. foreign policy in 2011 cannot be fully comprehended without reference to the creative path-breaking of President Theodore Roosevelt.
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ORGANIZERS
Claire Delahaye is a Wilson scholar and a specialist of Women’s History. She graduated from the École Normale Supérieure (Lyon) and received her Ph.D. from the Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, with a thesis on Woodrow Wilson and woman suffrage within the international context of the Great War. She is currently Lecturer in American History in the Department of English at the University of Paris Est Marne la Vallée. She has recently been hired by the University of Tours as Associate Professor, as of September 2011.
Serge Ricard is Professor Emeritus of American Studies and U.S. History at the Sorbonne Nouvelle (University of Paris III). He was educated at Davidson College, N.C., and at the Sorbonne, Paris, and was twice a Fulbright research scholar and many times a visiting scholar at Harvard University. He currently serves on the advisory board of the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, The Netherlands. He has taught at the universities of Oran, Algeria, Aix-Marseille and Montpellier, France, and at the University of Texas at Austin. He has published extensively in both French and English on Theodore Roosevelt, American expansionism, U.S. foreign policy in the late 19th and early 20th century, and Mexican-American culture. He is the editor and co-editor of numerous books—many of them co-edited with Pierre Melandri—and the author, notably, of Théodore Roosevelt: principes et pratique d’une politique étrangère (1991), The Mass Media in America: An Overview (1998), and The “Manifest Destiny” of the United States in the 19th Century: Ideological and Political Aspects (1999). He also edited the forthcoming A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011 [The American Presidents Series]), to which symposium participants M. Patrick Cullinane, Claire Delahaye, Douglas Eden, and William N. Tilchin contributed.
Fondation Simone et Cino Del Duca de l’Institut de France vue du square
